PRECISÃO EM MASSA E GUERRA CONECTADA: RELEVÂNCIA, LIMITES E DIFICULDADES DOS SISTEMAS NÃO TRIPULADOS NOS CONFLITOS DO LESTE EUROPEU E DO ORIENTE MÉDIO (2022-2026)

Autores

  • Sidney de Oliveira Carvalho
  • Jorge Luiz Pereira Bezerra
  • Alisson Pereira dos Santos
  • Rodrigo da Silva Nogueira

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63330/sasciencesv6n2-228

Palavras-chave:

Conflito russo-ucraniano, Defesa aérea, Guerra eletrônica, Oriente Médio, Precisão em massa, Sistemas não tripulados, Zona contestada

Resumo

O artigo analisa a relevância operacional e as dificuldades de emprego dos sistemas não tripulados de baixo custo nos dois grandes teatros de guerra da atualidade: o conflito russo-ucraniano e a sequência de confrontos no Oriente Médio que envolveu Israel, Irã, os Houthis do Iêmen, os Estados Unidos e as monarquias do Golfo entre 2023 e 2026. A pergunta de pesquisa é em que medida esses vetores alteraram a relação entre ataque e defesa no combate moderno e quais limites técnicos, industriais, econômicos e jurídicos condicionam seu uso. Sustenta-se a hipótese de que os drones não substituíram a guerra industrial, mas deslocaram o seu centro de gravidade para a capacidade de produzir, adaptar e repor sistemas em ciclos curtos, regime que a literatura recente chama de precisão em massa. A pesquisa é qualitativa, com apoio quantitativo descritivo, e adota o estudo de casos múltiplos. A base empírica reúne séries de dados abertas e relatórios de centros de pesquisa: o rastreador de ataques do CSIS, construído a partir dos boletins da Força Aérea ucraniana; as análises mensais do Institute for Science and International Security sobre a campanha dos Shahed; os relatórios de campo do RUSI; o balanço de defesa aérea da guerra de junho de 2025 elaborado pelo JINSA; os registros de ataques à navegação no Mar Vermelho compilados pela Lloyd’s List; e avaliações recentes do Hudson Institute sobre a guerra de 2026 contra o Irã. Os resultados mostram que, segundo dados ucranianos, os drones passaram a responder pela maior parte das perdas materiais russas no front, criaram ao longo da linha de contato uma zona contestada de cerca de 15 quilômetros, batida por fogos lançados de até 30 quilômetros além dela, na qual a manobra concentrada se tornou excepcional e permitiram a atores com recursos limitados atingir alvos estratégicos a milhares de quilômetros. Mostram também que sua eficácia individual é baixa, que dependem de cadeias de suprimento vulneráveis e que a vantagem que conferem é transitória, porque cada inovação gera uma contramedida em semanas ou meses. Conclui-se que a transformação é real, mas de natureza industrial e organizacional antes de ser tecnológica, e extraem-se implicações para o planejamento de defesa brasileiro.

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Publicado

2026-10-07

Como Citar

Carvalho, S. de O. ., Bezerra, J. L. P. ., dos Santos, A. P. ., & Nogueira, R. da S. . (2026). PRECISÃO EM MASSA E GUERRA CONECTADA: RELEVÂNCIA, LIMITES E DIFICULDADES DOS SISTEMAS NÃO TRIPULADOS NOS CONFLITOS DO LESTE EUROPEU E DO ORIENTE MÉDIO (2022-2026). South American Sciences, 6(2), e26455. https://doi.org/10.63330/sasciencesv6n2-228